The True Lender Doctrine: Function over Form as a Reasonable Constraint on the Exportation of Interest Rates by Hannon, John
HANNON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/1/2018 12:16 AM 
 
THE TRUE LENDER DOCTRINE: FUNCTION 
OVER FORM AS A REASONABLE 
CONSTRAINT ON THE EXPORTATION OF 
INTEREST RATES 
JOHN HANNON† 
ABSTRACT 
  The exportation doctrine permits national and state banks to export 
interest rates that are legal in one state where they operate to any other 
state, thereby shielding the banks from liability resulting from state 
usury claims. The doctrine has expanded over the last forty years to 
permit state and national banks to preempt a variety of state consumer-
financial-protection laws. The doctrine’s high-water mark is the 
emergence of the “rent-a-charter” arrangement, a scheme in which a 
nonbank lender uses a bank as a mere conduit to originate loans that 
are not subject to state usury laws. This Note argues that, at minimum, 
nonbank entities should not be allowed the benefit of the doctrine by 
temporarily occupying banks for the sole purpose of originating loans 
that are immune from state financial consumer protection laws.  
  A series of courts have recently begun applying a more exacting 
standard to these arrangements. Under the “true lender” doctrine, 
courts disregard the form of the lending configuration in favor of a 
searching examination of its substance, considering a variety of factors 
designed to determine which entity is the actual, rather than nominal, 
lender. This Note argues that the true lender doctrine’s singular focus 
on substance over form, combined with judicial agility to examine each 
factual constellation and detect any obfuscating formalities 
implemented by rent-a-charter parties, is presently the most effective 
way to sensibly limit the reach of the exportation doctrine. And, to the 
degree that banks assume more substantive duties in the lending 
process and retain some measure of risk in seeking to comply with the 
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doctrine, the results are broadly consistent with regulatory approaches 
that have been deployed in the wake of the financial crisis. 
INTRODUCTION  
The exportation doctrine permits national and state banks to 
export interest rates that are legal in one state where they operate—
generally a state with very permissive or nonexistent usury laws—to 
any other state, thereby shielding the banks from liability resulting 
from state usury claims.1 The doctrine began nearly forty years ago, 
and originally applied only to the nation’s “most favored lenders”: 
nationally chartered banks.2 This once-limited ability of national banks 
to evade state usury limits has devolved into a regime in which even 
nonchartered, uninsured institutions enjoy the ability to preempt a host 
of financial-consumer-protection laws and charge limitless interest 
rates3 across the country.4  
Commentators have lamented this expansive trajectory, pointing 
out that the original rationale for the exportation doctrine—fostering 
the development and maintenance of a national banking system—has 
long since been exceeded.5 It also appears to have been this 
unprincipled extension of the privilege that motivated the Second 
Circuit to impose an ill-considered limitation on the exportation 
doctrine.6 In May of 2015, the court held in Madden v. Midland 
Funding, LLC7 that a third-party nonbank debt collector that had 
purchased charged-off8 consumer credit card debts from a nationally 
 
 1. For the statutes, judicial decisions, and regulatory interpretations that have created and 
shaped the exportation doctrine, see infra Part I. 
 2. For the origins and development of the “most favored lender” doctrine, see infra Part I. 
 3. Some states do not impose any interest-rate caps on loans. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 
15-1-1(1) (West 2017) (“The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of 
interest . . . .”).  
 4. See generally Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding Exportation 
Doctrine and Its Effect on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REV. 518 (2004) 
(chronicling the expansion of the exportation doctrine and discussing its implications).  
 5. See, e.g., id. at 621–22 (arguing that the expansion of the exportation doctrine to 
encompass the issuing of tax refund anticipation loans and payday loans by nonbanks “is not 
justifiable under the principles of banking law from which [the doctrine] originally derived” 
(emphasis in original)). 
 6. For an examination of the Second Circuit’s motivation in the Madden decision, see infra 
Part II. 
 7. Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 
2505 (2016). 
 8. “A charge-off . . . is debt that is deemed unlikely to be collected by the creditor because 
the borrower has become substantially delinquent after a period of time.” Charge-Off, 
HANNON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/1/2018  12:16 AM 
2018] THE TRUE LENDER DOCTRINE 1263 
chartered bank did not also acquire the originating bank’s ability to 
preempt state usury laws with respect to the purchased loans.9 Prior to 
the decision, it was generally assumed—and two circuits had broadly 
indicated—that the exportation doctrine, like other contractual rights, 
passed with the loans to any subsequent assignee.10  
The Second Circuit’s ruling has upset the long-settled expectations 
of investors who had confidently purchased an array of securities 
comprised of instruments whose value was suddenly and unexpectedly 
compromised.11 More broadly, Madden injected an element of 
uncertainty into the secondary loan market, functionally imposing—at 
minimum—new information costs on a process otherwise 
characterized by unparalleled efficiency and liquidity.12  
The decision prompted a range of critiques, principally from 
groups concerned with the decision’s impact on the secondary loan 
market.13 Marketplace lenders and associated service industries were 
similarly disquieted.14 And, in a joint amicus brief, the Solicitor 
 
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/chargeoff.asp [http://perma.cc/J84N-
GQBE]. 
 9. Madden, 786 F.3d at 250. 
 10. See Krispin v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 218 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir. 2000) (explaining “that 
it makes sense to look to the originating entity” to determine whether a loan preempts state usury 
claims); FDIC v. Lattimore Land Corp., 656 F.2d 139, 148–49 (5th. Cir. 1981) (“The non-usurious 
character of a note should not change when the note changes hands.”). 
 11. For a discussion of the Madden decision’s impact, see infra Part II. 
 12. See Michael Marvin, Note, Interest Exportation and Preemption: Madden’s Impact on 
National Banks, the Secondary Credit Market, and P2P Lending, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1807, 1838 
(2016) (“The process of securitization may bundle borrowers of different risk profiles together, 
and therefore even extending credit to the least risky borrowers will entail higher transaction costs 
post-Madden when banks try to sell off that debt in a securitization.”). For a discussion of recent 
legislative efforts to remedy Madden’s impact, see infra note 87. 
 13. See, e.g., Kevin Wack, Debt-Sale Ruling Spooks Banks, Marketplace Lenders, AM. 
BANKER (July 24, 2015, 2:26 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/news/marketplace-
lending/debt-sale-ruling-spooks-banks-marketplace-lenders-1075654-1.html [http://perma.cc/
94XZ-D25W] (explaining that the ruling induced “a wave of anxiety at law firms, rating agencies 
and financial industry trade groups”).  
 14. “Marketplace lenders are nonbank lenders that rely heavily on online marketing and 
underwriting platforms.” OCC NAT’L RISK COMM., SEMIANNUAL RISK PERSPECTIVE (2016), 
https://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-publications-reports/semiannual-
risk-perspective/semiannual-risk-perspective-spring-2016.pdf [http://perma.cc/DQ46-L9GL]. 
Although this group of lenders has been relying on relationships with chartered banks in order to 
obtain the benefits of preemption, they do not generally fit the mold of an entity seeking to enjoy 
the privileges accorded to banks while evading the responsibilities and constraints traditionally 
imposed on banks. Moreover, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) has recently 
begun the process of granting limited-purpose charters to such lenders, thereby obviating their 
use of partnerships with chartered institutions. See generally OCC, EXPLORING SPECIAL 
PURPOSE NATIONAL BANK CHARTERS FOR FINTECH COMPANIES (2016), 
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General and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) 
unequivocally deemed the Second Circuit’s analysis incorrect.15 
Notwithstanding widespread discontent from the financial industry 
and its manifestation in the form of amici,16 the Supreme Court 
declined to hear the case in June of 2016.17 
The Madden court, this Note argues, was motivated by a prudent 
desire to diminish the scope of the exportation doctrine. 
Notwithstanding the court’s reasonable goal, the inhibitory impact that 
the court’s blunt approach has exacted on the secondary loan market 
is difficult to accept, even in exchange for any progress made in limiting 
the reach of the doctrine. However, in a line of cases involving payday 
lending, a judicial trend has emerged that is more capable of achieving 
the Second Circuit’s goal while avoiding the inefficiencies its ruling has 
generated: the “true lender” test. 
The true lender test arose in the context of perhaps the most 
egregious extension of the ability to preempt state usury laws, wherein 
payday lenders and other nonbank entities have periodically obtained 
the benefits of the exportation doctrine by utilizing an arrangement 
commonly referred to as “rent-a-charter.”18 In this model, a nonbank 
entity solicits borrowers, makes all the credit decisions, and directs a 
partner bank to originate its loans—only to purchase them from the 
 
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/responsible-innovation/comments/special-purpose-national-
bank-charters-for-fintech.pdf [http://perma.cc/57BH-7F6F] (exploring whether the OCC should 
issue special-purpose bank charters to FinTech companies). Marketplace lenders responded 
enthusiastically about assuming increased responsibility and oversight in exchange for gaining 
access to the rights of traditional banks. See, e.g., Letter from Richard H. Neiman, Lending Club, 
to Thomas J. Curry, OCC, at 2 (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.occ.gov/topics/responsible-
innovation/comments/comment-lending-club.pdf [http://perma.cc/6EDS-4WY9] (“Obtaining a 
national bank charter brings responsibilities alongside its privileges, and we fully support the 
OCC’s efforts to ensure that applicants for the special purpose charter satisfy standards that 
protect the banking system and ensure consumers and businesses are served in a safe, fair, and 
responsible manner.”). Because the implications of the judicial developments discussed here on 
the continued viability of marketplace lending are very likely to become moot in light of the 
OCC’s fast-moving process toward the establishment of a limited national charter for such firms, 
this Note will not evaluate its proposals by reference to marketplace lenders. 
 15. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6, Midland Funding, LLC v. Madden, 
136 S. Ct. 2505 (2016) (No. 15-610). Despite its criticism of the Second Circuit’s decision, the 
amicus brief advocated for a denial of the petition for certiorari on grounds that no genuine circuit 
split existed. Id. 
 16. See, e.g., Brief of the Structured Fin. Indus. Grp., Inc. & the Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. 
Ass’n as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Madden, 136 S. Ct. 2505 (No. 15-610).  
 17. Madden, 136 S. Ct. 2505 (mem.).  
 18. See, e.g., West Virginia v. CashCall, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 781, 783 (S.D. W. Va. 2009) 
(describing a payday lender’s bank partnership as a “‘rent-a-bank’ or ‘rent-a-charter’ scheme 
designed to avoid West Virginia usury laws”). 
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bank within days. This use of a chartered bank as a conduit to originate 
loans thereby confers on the loans the full preemptive shield of the 
exportation doctrine. However, a series of courts have recently begun 
applying a more exacting level of scrutiny to these arrangements.19 
Courts applying the true lender test disregard the form of the lending 
configuration in favor of a searching examination of its substance, 
considering a variety of factors designed to determine which entity is 
the actual lender.20 Only after making that determination will the 
courts decide whether the actual lender is entitled to the broad 
protections granted to chartered insured21 depository institutions. In 
contrast to the inflexible and overbroad approach of the Madden court, 
the true lender doctrine looks past the superficial form of rent-a-
charter arrangements in order to ascertain whether the bank that is 
entitled to the preemption of state laws is the real lender receiving such 
protection.22 
This Note argues that the burgeoning true lender doctrine 
represents a judicial mechanism capable of imposing a sensible limit on 
the heretofore endless scope of the exportation doctrine, while 
avoiding the uncertain market conditions sown by Madden’s approach. 
This Note further argues that the impact of the true lender doctrine on 
rent-a-charter arrangements is consistent with the regulatory 
 
 19. See CFPB v. CashCall, Inc., No. CV 15-7522-JFW (RAOx), 2016 WL 4820635, at *6 
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2016) (applying a totality-of-the-circumstances test to determine that the 
nonbank entity, not the originating tribal lender, was the true lender); Pennsylvania v. Think Fin., 
Inc., No. 14-cv-7139, 2016 WL 183289, at *18 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2016) (denying a motion to dismiss 
in a usury action because plaintiffs had alleged facts sufficient to support an inference that the 
nonbank entity was the true lender and did not enjoy the privilege of the exportation doctrine); 
CashCall, Inc. v. Morrisey, No. 12-1274, 2014 WL 2404300, at *15 (W. Va. May 30, 2014), cert. 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 2050 (2015) (affirming the trial court’s conclusion that the nonbank lender was 
the de facto lender and was therefore not entitled to preemption of West Virginia’s usury laws). 
 20. While the factors being considered are largely similar between cases, courts have been 
generally imprecise in labeling the fledgling doctrine, resulting in several denominations in 
addition to true lender, such as the de facto lender test and the predominant interest test. See 
CFPB, 2016 WL 4820635, at *6 (alternatingly referring to the de facto lender, the predominant 
economic interest, and the true lender tests); Morrisey, 2014 WL 2404300, at *14 (referring to 
both the true lender and the predominant interest test).  
 21. Insured Depository Institutions are member banks of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC). Both state and nationally chartered banks may, and functionally must, join 
the FDIC. See Schiltz, supra note 4, at 542 n.103 (“[A]s a practical matter, federal deposit 
insurance is regarded as a competitive necessity.”). 
 22. For a discussion of the cases that have developed the substance-over-form approach of 
the true lender doctrine, see infra Part III. 
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approaches employed by the Dodd-Frank Act (Dodd-Frank)23 and 
might complement Dodd Frank’s structural safeguards, which are 
designed to promote systemic safety and soundness in an increasingly 
interconnected financial landscape.  
Part I traces the origin and progression of the exportation 
doctrine, explains how the doctrine is in need of a limiting principle, 
and details the ways in which expansive determinations of preemption 
of state regulation is thought to have contributed to the financial crisis. 
Part II reviews Madden’s holding, considers the Second Circuit’s likely 
motivation for its ruling, and details the ramifications of the court’s 
overly broad principle in areas that may not have been anticipated. 
Part III describes the true lender doctrine and advocates for its 
enshrinement as a judicial doctrine capable of imposing and policing a 
line that precludes undeserving lenders from enjoying the exportation 
doctrine’s protection without impeding unintended markets or 
upsetting long-settled expectations. Part III also argues that the true 
lender doctrine is broadly consistent with, and may help to supplement, 
the regulatory approaches employed by Dodd-Frank in the areas of 
prudential “safety and soundness” and consumer protection. 
I.  THE EXPORTATION DOCTRINE AND PREEMPTION OF STATE 
CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS 
The exportation doctrine grew out of a statutory scheme, and 
associated Supreme Court case law, that was primarily intended to 
protect a then-nascent national banking system from protectionist 
attack by the states. But over the last forty years, the doctrine has 
expanded in ways that have no basis in its original rationale. Notably, 
the exportation doctrine has been extended to allow undeserving 
nonbank lenders to originate loans through banks in order to evade 
interest-rate caps. This and related expansions have protected an array 
of actors from state interest-rate limitations and other consumer-
protection laws that contributed, in part, to the financial crisis. 
Recognizing this relationship, Congress and the Supreme Court have 
recently acted to halt or reverse these expansive preemption trends in 
the area of financial-services regulation. This Part details the historical 
trajectory of the exportation doctrine, from its creation and subsequent 
expansion through the recent laws and court cases that have sought to 
 
 23. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
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return to the states the ability to enact and enforce consumer-financial-
protection laws.  
A. National Banks as National Favorites 
Until the 1860s, the banking system in the United States was 
decentralized.24 Recognizing the shortcomings of a fragmented 
system—namely the inability to fund its operations—Congress set out 
to establish a well-functioning national banking system with a series of 
enactments in the mid-1860s collectively referred to as the National 
Bank Act (NBA).25 In addition to the creation of a national currency, 
one of the chief goals of the NBA was to force the conversion of state-
chartered banks into national charters;26 in this aim, the NBA imposed 
an onerous 10 percent tax on all bank notes issued by state-chartered 
banks.27  
Noting the clarity of purpose underlying the legislation, the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly interpreted ambiguities in the NBA by 
opting for readings that are consistent with a national vision of 
banking.28 And, especially when confronted with state legislation that 
tended to inhibit the growth of a vibrant national banking system, the 
Court has ruled in ways that ensured competitive equality between 
state and national banks or even conferred a competitive advantage on 
national banks.29 For example, in Tiffany v. National Bank of 
 
 24. See MICHAEL S. BARR, HOWELL E. JACKSON & MARGARET E. TAHYAR, FINANCIAL 
REGULATION: LAW & POLICY 35–37 (2016) (detailing earlier, short-lived attempts to create a 
national banking system, followed by an era of decentralized “free banking”). 
 25. See An Act to Provide a National Currency, Secured by a Pledge of United States Stocks, 
and to Provide for the Circulation and Redemption Thereof, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665 (1863), repealed 
and reenacted with amendments by An Act to Provide a National Currency, Secured by a Pledge 
of United States Bonds, and to Provide for the Circulation and Redemption Thereof, ch. 106, 13 
Stat. 99 (1864). See generally S. Res. 298, 66th Cong. (1920) (compiling the statutes which 
constitute “The National Bank Act and Acts Amendatory Thereof and Supplementary 
Thereto”). 
 26. BARR ET AL., supra note 24, at 38–39. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See, e.g., Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 
299, 314–15 (1978) (“Close examination of the National Bank Act of 1864, its legislative history, 
and its historical context makes clear that . . . Congress intended to facilitate . . . a ‘national 
banking system.’”); Easton v. Iowa, 188 U.S. 220, 229 (1903) (explaining that by enacting the 
NBA, Congress sought to create a banking “system extending throughout the country, and 
independent, so far as powers conferred are concerned, of state legislation which, if permitted to 
be applicable, might impose limitations and restrictions as various and as numerous as the 
States”).  
 29. See, e.g., Farmers’ & Mechs.’ Nat’l Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.S. 29, 34 (1875) (finding that a 
state remedy for usury against national banks was preempted by the NBA, and explaining that 
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Missouri,30 the Court was confronted with a Missouri statute that was 
intended to make banking unprofitable in the state by restricting the 
interest rates banks could charge while permitting all other lenders to 
collect interest at a higher rate.31 The Court identified congressional 
intent in the NBA to conclude that “National banks have been 
National favorites” in the eyes of the federal government,32 and as such 
should be permitted to charge the highest rate of interest enjoyed by 
any lender under state law.33 Tiffany would serve as the foundation for 
a hundred years of Supreme Court jurisprudence, known as the “[m]ost 
[f]avored [l]ender [d]octrine,” in which the Court sought to implement 
the NBA’s aim of a strong national banking system by overriding state 
laws that impeded this goal.34 
In a continuation of this trend, the Supreme Court in Marquette 
National Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha35 held that the NBA 
provision codified at 12 U.S.C. § 85, which permits national banks to 
charge “interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State . . . where 
 
“the States can exercise no control over [national banks], nor in any wise affect their operation, 
except in so far as Congress may see proper to permit”). 
 30. Tiffany v. Nat’l Bank of Mo., 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409 (1873). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 413. 
 33. Id. at 412–13. The Court has regularly noted that the establishment of a national banking 
system is premised on the perceived utility of such a system to the federal government. See Easton, 
188 U.S. at 230 (tracing the origins of this relationship by pointing out that “[t]he whole opinion 
of the court, in McCulloch v. Maryland, is founded on, and sustained by, the idea that the bank is 
an instrument which is ‘necessary and proper for carrying into effect the powers vested in the 
government of the United States.’”); Davis v. Elmira Sav. Bank, 161 U.S. 275, 283 (1896) 
(“National banks are instrumentalities of the Federal government . . . .”); Farmers’ & Mechs.’ 
Nat’l Bank, 91 U.S. at 33 (“The national banks organized under the act are instruments designed 
to be used to aid the government in the administration of an important branch of the public 
service.”). Historically, as exemplified by the temporal relationship between the Civil War and 
the NBA, the importance of banks to the federal government related to the use of banks to raise 
funds for war. See BARR ET AL., supra note 24, at 32, 34, 37 (noting that each major foray into the 
creation of a national banking system was related to the necessity of funding wars). In modernity, 
in addition to raising funds for the federal government, banks assist in the implementation of 
federal monetary policy. See Monetary Policy Basics, FED. RES. EDUC., 
https://www.federalreserveeducation.org/about-the-fed/structure-and-functions/monetary-policy 
[https://perma.cc/GJ4D-YGSL] (“The term ‘monetary policy’ refers to what the Federal Reserve, 
the nation’s central bank, does to influence the amount of money and credit in the U.S. economy. 
What happens to money and credit affects interest rates . . . and the performance of the U.S. 
economy.”). 
 34. See Schiltz, supra note 4, at 545 (“[Section] 85 consistently has been interpreted to permit 
national banks to make loans at the highest rates permitted any type of lender under the laws of 
the state in which the bank is located.”). 
 35. Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978). 
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the bank is located,”36 allowed national banks to charge the interest 
rates permissible in the state in which they are located37 to customers 
in any other state in the country.38 The Court examined the legislative 
history of the NBA and the Court’s own interpretations to conclude 
that the purpose of § 85 was to facilitate a national banking system,39 
and thus, any concerns about competitive equality between state and 
national banks40 or about the ability of states to enact usury laws were 
immaterial.41 With the Marquette decision, the Court created a 
regime—one that would come to be known as the exportation 
doctrine—in which a bank could be formally “located” in one 
jurisdiction solely for purposes of interest-rate exportation.42 
B. Extension to State-Chartered Banks and the Enlarged Meaning of 
“Interest” 
In the wake of Marquette, several states commenced a race to the 
bottom, either reducing or removing altogether interest-rate ceilings 
on consumer loans in an attempt to lure national banks.43 Faced with 
what turned out to be an incredible competitive disadvantage, state 
banks lobbied Congress to level the playing field.44 Congress 
responded with the Depository Institutions Deregulation and 
Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA),45 which borrowed statutory 
language from § 85 to extend the privilege of interest-rate exportation 
 
 36. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2018). 
 37. At the time of Marquette, interstate branching was prohibited, so banks were “located” 
in only one jurisdiction. See Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis, 439 U.S. at 309. Accordingly, 
the determination of the location of a bank for purposes of interest-rate exportation was simple. 
The national bank in Marquette was lending via mail across state lines. Id. at 310. 
 38. Id. at 313. 
 39. Id. at 314–15. 
 40. Id. at 314 (“Whatever policy of ‘competitive equality’ has been discerned in other 
sections of the National Bank Act, . . . [§ 85 and its predecessors] have been interpreted for over 
a century to give ‘advantages to National banks over their State competitors.’” (quoting Tiffany 
v. Nat’l Bank of Mo., 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409, 413 (1873))). 
 41. Id. at 318 (rejecting the importance of the argument “that the ‘exportation’ of interest 
rates . . . will significantly impair the ability of States to enact effective usury laws” because such 
a limitation “has always been implicit in the structure of the National Bank Act”). 
 42. See Schiltz, supra note 4, at 543 (“Under the Exportation Doctrine . . . depository 
institutions are given the power to select one particular state’s consumer credit regulation and 
give it preemptive effect over all other state consumer credit laws.”). 
 43. BARR ET AL., supra note 24, at 126–27. 
 44. Id. at 127. 
 45. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 
96–221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.). 
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to state banks.46 In Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts,47 the First 
Circuit confirmed that this state-chartered bank analogue of the NBA 
permits state banks to export interest rates in the same manner as 
national banks post-Marquette.48 The DIDMCA and the cases 
interpreting it represent the first of several transgressions of the 
ideological underpinnings of the exportation doctrine. That is, 
extending the ability to export interest rates to state-chartered banks is 
difficult to square with the NBA’s original goal of preventing bias 
against nationally chartered banks in order to facilitate a vibrant 
national banking system.49  
Over the next fifteen years, the OCC effected another 
enlargement of the exportation doctrine by expanding the meaning of 
“interest” as used in § 85. Courts largely accepted the OCC’s expansive 
interpretations of “interest” to encompass late fees50 and credit card 
overlimit fees.51 And in 1997, the OCC issued an interpretive letter 
setting forth a liberal test for determining what constitutes interest for 
purposes of the exportation doctrine,52 as well as providing an 
illustrative list.53 
Finally, in the most severe violation of the underpinnings of the 
exportation doctrine, an array of nonbank lenders have acquired the 
ability to preempt state consumer-protection laws by entering into 
 
 46. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a) (2018) (permitting interest to be charged by “[s]tate-chartered 
insured depository institutions . . . at the rate allowed by the laws of the State . . . where the bank 
is located”). 
 47. Greenwood Tr. Co. v. Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1992).  
 48. See id. at 827 (“[W]e believe that several principles inherent in section 85 were transfused 
into section 521, the critical item for present purposes [being] the principle of exportation.”). 
 49. See Schiltz, supra note 4, at 545 (explaining how § 85, “a statutory provision aimed at 
preventing states from destroying the national banking system in its infancy, came to justify a 
legal doctrine preempting virtually all significant state consumer credit laws”). 
 50. Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740 (1996); Greenwood Tr. Co., 971 F.2d 
at 819. 
 51. Watson v. First Union Nat’l Bank of S.C., 837 F. Supp. 146, 150 (D.S.C. 1993); Tikkanen 
v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 801 F. Supp. 270, 278 (D. Minn. 1992). 
 52. See OCC, Interpretive Letter No. 803, at 2 (Oct. 7, 1997) (“The term ‘interest’ as used 
in 12 U.S.C. § 85 includes any payment compensating a creditor or prospective creditor for an 
extension of, credit, making available of a line of credit, or any default or breach by a borrower 
of a condition upon which credit was extended . . . .” (emphasis added) (quoting 12 C.F.R. 
§ 74001(a) (1997))).  
 53. See id. (“[Interest] includes, among other things, the following fees connected with credit 
extension or availability: numerical periodic rates, late fees, not sufficient funds (NSF) fees, 
overlimit fees, annual fees, cash advance fees, and membership fees.”). 
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rent-a-charter arrangements with state and national banks,54 in which 
a bank formally originates loans in accordance with a nonbank lender’s 
credit decisions and then immediately sells the loans to the nonbank 
lender.55 While the previous enlargements of the exportation doctrine 
constituted expansions of what chartered banks could themselves do, 
the exploitation of the doctrine by rent-a-charter arrangements permits 
wholly undeserving entities to evade state usury limits without 
incurring any commensurate obligations and without serving any of the 
beneficial functions of traditional banks.56 
C. Expansive Preemption Determinations by the OCC and Reviewing 
Courts 
As illustrated by its liberal interpretations of the definition of 
“interest” for purposes of the exportation doctrine, the OCC has often 
enunciated expansive and favorable statutory interpretations for 
national banks.57 Moreover, when prompted to make determinations 
regarding the preemption of state banking and consumer-protection 
regulation, the OCC has invariably found that the state laws were 
preempted. For example, in 2004 the OCC promulgated regulations 
that declared that “state laws that obstruct, impair, or condition a 
national bank’s ability to fully exercise its Federally authorized real 
estate lending powers” were preempted.58 This expansive blanket 
preemption provided that “a national bank may make real estate loans 
. . . without regard to state law limitations concerning” mortgage 
disclosures, interest rates, origination and servicing, and loan terms.59 
And when OCC action was challenged in court, judicial deference to 
 
 54. The OCC maintains that, after several enforcement actions and associated guidance in 
the early 2000s, it has completely eliminated rent-a-charter arrangements between payday lenders 
and national banks. See Payday Lending, OCC, https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/consumer-
protection/payday-lending/index-payday-lending.html [https://perma.cc/4T7F-527K] (listing the 
enforcement actions “that eliminated these relationships from the national banking system”).  
 55. See, e.g., BARR ET AL., supra note 24, at 622 (summarizing the proliferation of payday 
lenders entering into rent-a-charter arrangements). 
 56. See Schiltz, supra note 4, at 540–41 (explaining that privileges accorded chartered banks 
are tied to the important role they play as financial intermediaries, and that these privileges 
additionally come at the cost of “extensive regulation of almost every facet of [banks’] day-to-day 
operations”).  
 57. See generally id. (detailing the various interpretations advanced by the OCC that 
expanded the range of state laws preempted by § 85). 
 58. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904, 
1911 (Jan. 13, 2004).  
 59. Id. at 1917. 
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the OCC’s interpretations under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resource Defense Council, Inc.60 was often dispositive.61 
D. Dodd-Frank’s Spirit of Stronger State Regulatory Mechanisms 
The authors of Dodd-Frank concluded that the OCC’s 
preemption determinations and the judicial affirmations thereof 
prevented the operation of strong state consumer-protection laws and 
enforcement in the years leading up the financial crisis.62 Dodd-Frank’s 
drafters further concluded that this phenomenon contributed 
significantly to the subprime mortgage crisis.63 In response, Dodd-
Frank seeks to return to the states the ability to effectively monitor and 
regulate financial institutions.64  
In furtherance of this goal, Dodd-Frank prescribes the preemption 
standard that the OCC must use in deciding which state consumer-
financial laws are preempted.65 Whereas the OCC had previously 
found state laws preempted if applying the laws would merely 
“obstruct, impair, or condition” the operation of a national bank, 
Dodd-Frank requires a higher preemption standard. Dodd-Frank 
incorporates the preemption standards of a Supreme Court case, 
Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson,66 which preempts state 
laws that “prevent[] or significantly interfere[] with the exercise by the 
national bank of its powers.”67 Dodd-Frank also requires the OCC to 
 
 60. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 61. See, e.g., Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 739 (1996) (applying Chevron 
deference to the OCC’s interpretation of “interest” as encompassing late fees); Wachovia Bank, 
N.A. v. Watters, 431 F.3d 556, 560 (6th Cir. 2005) (affirming the district court’s Chevron analysis 
that concluded that the OCC’s finding of preemption of a state registration and consumer-
protection-investigation law was reasonable), aff’d, 550 U.S. 1 (2007); see also Schiltz, supra note 
4, at 620 (“A close analysis of expansion of the substantive scope of the Exportation Doctrine 
illustrates the vigor of judicial deference to federal agency interpretations in the area of consumer 
credit regulation.”). 
 62. See S. REP. No. 111-176, at 17 (2010) (concluding that the OCC’s preemption decisions 
had “actively created an environment where abusive mortgage lending could flourish without 
State controls”). 
 63. Id.  
 64. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 25b (2018) (imposing a host of requirements on the analysis of 
preemption of state consumer-financial laws). See generally Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-
Frank Act’s Expansion of State Authority To Protect Consumers of Financial Services, 36 J. CORP. 
L. 893 (2011) (examining provisions in Dodd-Frank that empower states to enact and enforce 
consumer-financial-protection laws). 
 65. See Wilmarth, supra note 64, at 927–30. 
 66. Barnett Bank of Marion Cty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996). 
 67. 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added). 
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make such preemption determinations on a case-by-case basis,68 a clear 
rejection of the OCC’s blanket preemption of state mortgage-lending 
regulation in 2004.69 Additionally, in an apparent assignment of blame 
to the OCC for its expansive interpretations about which state 
consumer-financial laws were preempted for national banks before the 
financial crisis, Dodd-Frank expressly prescribes a more searching 
standard of review for courts reviewing such OCC determinations.70 
Post–financial crisis, the Supreme Court has also enunciated a 
more restrictive view of financial regulation preemption. The 
paradigmatic example is the Court’s rejection of preemption of state 
regulation in Cuomo v. Clearing House Association,71 in which the 
Court’s review of an OCC regulation concerning preemption seemed 
rather different than its approach to a similar regulation two years prior 
in Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.72 In Watters—decided in 2007, 
before the financial crisis—the Court upheld an OCC regulation that 
permitted a mortgage-lending subsidiary of a national bank to enjoy 
the same preemption of state consumer-financial-protection laws as its 
 
 68. Id. The provision additionally requires that, in making preemption determinations on a 
case-by-case basis, the OCC “shall first consult with the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection 
and shall take the views of the Bureau into account when making the determination.” Id. 
§ 25b(b)(3)(B). 
 69. See Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 
1904 (Jan. 13, 2004) (promulgating rule preempting all state mortgage laws “that obstruct, impair, 
or condition a national bank’s ability to fully exercise its Federally authorized real estate lending 
powers”). In 2011, as required by § 25b, the OCC implemented a final rule removing the 
“obstruct, impair, or condition” language from the regulation, and inserting the above-mentioned 
statutorily prescribed changes into its regulations. Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-
Frank Act Implementation, 76 Fed. Reg. 43549, 43551–52, 43556 (July 21, 2011) (current version  
codified at 12 C.F.R. § 34.4 (2018)). 
 70. Congress expressly revoked from the OCC the very deferential standard of review for 
courts reviewing agency determinations announced in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984). See 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(A) (directing courts 
reviewing the OCC’s preemption determinations for state consumer-financial laws to apply a 
more stringent standard of review, involving an assessment of “the validity of such 
determinations, depending upon the thoroughness evident in the consideration of the agency, the 
validity of the reasoning of the agency, the consistency with other valid determinations made by 
the agency, and other factors which the court finds persuasive and relevant”). 
 71. Cuomo v. Clearing House Assoc., 557 U.S. 519, 536 (2009). 
 72. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 20–22 (2007); see Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., 
Cuomo v. Clearing House: The Supreme Court Responds to the Subprime Financial Crisis and 
Delivers a Major Victory for the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection 14 (GWU Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 479, 2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=1499216 [https://perma.cc/3JG9-V33G] (noting the opposite rulings on highly similar facts, and 
reviewing the Cuomo decision to illustrate the difference between the Court’s pre–financial crisis 
decisions affirming OCC preemption determinations and its post–financial crisis decisions 
restricting the OCC’s preemption determinations).  
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parent bank.73 But in Cuomo—decided in 2009, as the damage caused 
by the subprime mortgage crisis was on full display—the Court rejected 
an OCC regulation which forbid state attorneys general from bringing 
actions to enforce state law against national banks.74 Although the four 
dissenting justices in Cuomo maintained that the Court’s opinion in 
Watters should lead the Court to sustain the regulation on the same 
grounds,75 the majority opinion attempted to narrow the precedential 
scope of Watters.76 
II.  THE MADDEN DECISION, ITS RAMIFICATIONS, AND THE 
MOTIVES OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
The Second Circuit’s opinion in Madden, which held that a 
nonbank third-party debt collector was not entitled to receive the 
protection of the exportation doctrine,77 has caused uncertainty in a 
variety of financial-services contexts. In withholding the doctrine from 
the debt collector, the court—seemingly motivated by a number of 
sensible concerns—effectively limited the type of actors that are 
entitled to the doctrine’s privileges. The information costs generated 
by the decision, however, have proved too great to accept in exchange 
for any success in halting the trend of expansive financial regulation 
preemption. 
The plaintiff in Madden brought suit—as the representative of a 
putative class—against a debt collector, Midland Funding, LLC, who 
had purchased her charged-off credit card debt from Bank of 
America.78 Bank of America, who, as a nationally chartered bank, is 
uncontrovertibly entitled to the exportation doctrine, had originated 
and serviced the debt at issue until it became nonperforming, at which 
point the bank sold the debt to Midland Funding.79 The suit alleged, 
 
 73. Watters, 550 U.S. at 20–22; see Wilmarth, supra note 72, at 2 (“Watters took a broad view 
of the preemptive reach of the NBA . . . .”). 
 74. Cuomo, 550 U.S. at 529–33. 
 75. See id. at 552 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Finally, this Court’s decision in Watters . . . 
supports OCC’s construction of the statute.”). 
 76. See Wilmarth, supra note 72, at 12 (examining each opinion to conclude that “[t]he 
majority opinion in Cuomo sharply limited the scope and precedential effect of the Court’s 
previous opinion in Watters”). 
 77. Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246, 247 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. 
Ct. 2505 (2016) (mem.). 
 78. Id. at 247–48. Midland actually acquired the debt from Bank of America subsidiary bank 
FIA Card Services, N.A., which is also nationally chartered. Id. 
 79. Id. at 248.  
HANNON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/1/2018  12:16 AM 
2018] THE TRUE LENDER DOCTRINE 1275 
inter alia, that Midland’s assessment of 27 percent interest on the debt 
was usurious under New York law.80 The district court entered 
judgment for Midland, finding that the debt collector was entitled to 
the same protection from state usury law claims as the originating 
bank.81 On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed after finding, in 
accordance with the preemption analysis announced by the Supreme 
Court in Barnett,82 that applying state usury laws against Midland (that 
is, declining to apply the exportation doctrine) would not “significantly 
interfere with [the national bank’s] ability to exercise its powers under 
the [NBA].”83 The court conceded that the ruling might depress the 
price at which a national bank could sell its nonperforming debt to 
third parties, but indicated that such an effect did not rise to the level 
of “significant interference.”84 
What the Second Circuit either failed to consider or believed 
unlikely to materialize was the impact of its analysis beyond the context 
of third-party debt collectors. Specifically, the court may not have 
anticipated the extension of its ruling to an enormous85 secondary loan 
market that benefits a variety of actors.86  
The Madden ruling injected an unprecedented element of 
uncertainty into a market that had long relied on the fixed quality of 
debt obligations underlying securities.87 Though ruling on the 
 
 80. Id.; see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.40 (McKinney 2010) (capping permissible interest rates 
at 25 percent).  
 81. Madden, 786 F.3d at 248. 
 82. Barnett Bank of Marion Cty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996).  For a discussion of 
Congress’s codification of the Barnett standard as part of a trend toward returning the ability to 
regulate financial institutions to the states, see supra Part I. 
 83. Madden, 786 F.3d at 251.  
 84. Id. The Second Circuit remanded the case for the district court to make a further 
determination on the effect of a choice-of-law provision in the loan agreements. Id. at 249. On 
remand, the district court found that to give effect to the choice-of-law provision and apply 
Delaware’s more permissive interest rate limitations would violate a fundamental public policy 
of New York state. See Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 237 F. Supp. 3d 130, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 
2017) (“I will thus apply New York law to Plaintiff’s claims.”). 
 85. See generally Brief of the Structured Fin. Indus. Grp., Inc., & the Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. 
Ass’n as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note 16 (describing the size of the 
secondary market).  
 86. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON 
RISK RETENTION 8–9 (2010), http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/
securitization/riskretention.pdf [https://perma.cc/GG2N-MNYK] (reviewing the economic 
benefits to market participants flowing from securitization and speculating that these benefits 
“may lower the cost of credit to households and businesses”). 
 87. See Bryan Chegwidden, Second Circuit Decision Could Disrupt Secondary Market for 
Bank-Originated Loans, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (2015), 
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preemptive scope of national bank lending, commentators have noted 
that the same limitation might be applied by future courts to the 
identical provision for state-chartered banks, increasing the 
uncertainty faced by assignees of bank-originated loans.88 
Facially, in light of the sheer size of securitization in the American 
economy,89 a rule that ties the legality of a loan’s terms to the entity 
that holds it seems likely to seriously impede both the efficiency and 
the liquidity of the system, reducing or eliminating the benefits 
securitization confers.90 One of the principal benefits of securitization 
 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/07/08/second-circuit-decision-could-disrupt-secondary-
market-for-bank-originated-loans [https://perma.cc/CJP2-VKWX] (“Consequently, unless 
reversed, Madden could significantly disrupt the secondary market for bank loans originated by 
national banks, as well as affect the valuation of such loans already held by non-bank investors.”). 
Congress has recently introduced “Madden fix” bills in both chambers that would, in essence, 
codify the contractual principle of “valid-when-made.” E.g., Protecting Consumers’ Access to 
Credit Act of 2017, S. 1642, 115th Cong. (referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs on July 27, 2017). For instance, the Protecting Consumers’ Access to Credit Card 
Act of 2017 would insert the following language into both § 85 of the NBA and its analogue at 
§ 1831d:  
A loan that is valid when made as to its maximum rate of interest in accordance with 
this subsection shall remain valid with respect to such rate regardless of whether the 
loan is subsequently sold, assigned, or otherwise transferred to a third party, and may 
be enforced by such third party notwithstanding any State law to the contrary.  
Id. Professor Adam Levitin has persuasively detailed his concerns that the bill might pave the way 
for increased predatory lending. Adam J. Levitin, ‘Madden Fix’ Bills are a Recipe for Predatory 
Lending, AM. BANKER (Aug. 28, 2017, 10:24 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/
madden-fix-bills-are-a-recipe-for-predatory-lending [https://perma.cc/4H8R-YAHQ]. Levitin 
fears that the bills’ failure to distinguish between “relatively benign transactions, like credit card 
securitization or even facilitating a secondary market in defaulted loans” from “schemes that have 
no purpose other than the evasion of state usury laws and other consumer protections” will serve 
to congressionally authorize these latter transactions. Id. However, as explained infra at Part 
III.B, even if a Madden fix law is enacted, a robust application of the true lender doctrine should—
at least with respect to rent-a-charter lenders—operate to prevent this outcome, as the test does 
not ever arrive at a conclusion that a loan has become usurious upon sale or assignment, but rather 
that it was invalid even at the point of origination because it was not genuinely “made” by a lender 
entitled to charge such interest rates. Stated another way, the true lender doctrine seeks to 
identify whether loans truly were valid-when-made, and only an affirmative answer will even 
trigger application of the Madden fix law. 
 88. See Marc P. Franson, Michael S. Himmel, Peter C. Manbeck & Kenneth P. Marin, 
Federal Court Decision Creates Uncertainty for Non-Bank Loan Assignees Regarding the Scope 
of Federal Preemption of State Usury Laws, 132 BANKING L.J. 413, 415–16 (2015) (explaining that 
the decision’s impact may ultimately be applied to state-chartered banks). 
 89. See Brief of the Structured Fin. Indus. Grp., Inc. & the Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note 16, at 10 (finding nine trillion dollars in loans 
securitized in 2014).  
 90. See BARR ET AL., supra note 24, at 1140–42 (reviewing the benefits and logic of 
securitization).  
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is the increased lending it facilitates.91 Indeed, the ability of banks to 
offer a variety of lending options to consumers and businesses is 
inextricably tied to a well-functioning secondary market.92 A skittish 
secondary market invariably dampens banks’ willingness to extend 
credit. Unsure whether there will be a market for pools of loans that 
will otherwise remain on their balance sheets, banks lend more 
sparingly. 
Empirically, the Madden ruling has reduced the value in the 
secondary market of potentially usurious loans.93 Moreover, even if the 
loans and parties in a transaction on the secondary loan market are 
unaffected by Madden—by virtue of having no nexus with Second 
Circuit states—the decision has nevertheless imposed on them 
additional information costs by forcing them to ascertain whether the 
loans they are buying are subject to the Second Circuit’s new rule.94 
Several facets of the Madden opinion suggest that the court was 
motivated, at least in part, by a desire to withhold the benefits of the 
exportation doctrine from nonbank entities. While the effect of the 
ruling has emanated—perhaps unintentionally—beyond the market 
segments represented by the parties to the case, the court’s analysis was 
far from unsophisticated. Indeed, the opinion evidences an awareness 
of the troublingly expansive scope of the exportation doctrine, as well 
as an understanding of several broad trends in financial regulation that 
are designed to remedy some of the problems thought to have led to 
the financial crisis.  
For example, the court indicated its discomfort with the breadth 
of the exportation doctrine, expressing its unease about “an overly 
broad application” of the doctrine.95 It further characterized the effect 
 
 91. See generally Lowell L. Bryan, Structured Securitized Credit: A Superior Technology for 
Lending, 1 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 6 (1988) (delineating the benefits of securitizations to banks, 
investors, and borrowers via increased availability of credit). 
 92. See Brief of the Structured Fin. Indus. Grp., Inc. & the Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note 16, at 6 (“The ability to securitize bank loans 
is fundamentally important to banks, borrowers, and the economy.”). 
 93. Colleen Honigsberg, Robert J. Jackson, Jr. & Richard Squire, How Does Legal 
Enforceability Affect Consumer Lending? Evidence from a Natural Experiment, J.L. & ECONS. 
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 4), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2780215&download=yes [https://perma.cc/5LRQ-F5X2].  
 94. See Marvin, supra note 12, at 1837 & n.185 (collecting sources that illustrate the costs 
imposed on the secondary market by the imposition of new requirements of due diligence post-
Madden). 
 95. Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. 
Ct. 2505 (2016). 
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of preempting state usury laws for debt collectors as tantamount to 
creating “an end-run around usury laws for non-national bank entities 
that are not acting on behalf of a national bank.”96  
Additionally, the Second Circuit’s principal reliance on Barnett’s 
“prevents or significantly interferes” standard of preemption is a good-
faith application of Dodd-Frank’s more stringent standard for finding 
preemption of state consumer-protection laws. As discussed in Part I, 
Congress codified the more restrictive standard from Barnett in Dodd-
Frank with a clear intent to repudiate both the OCC’s expansive 
preemption interpretations and similarly permissive judicial decisions 
leading up to the financial crisis.97 The Barnett standard thus 
intentionally imposed a variety of restraints on the OCC and reviewing 
courts in making preemption determinations moving forward.98  
Madden’s analysis of relevant case law similarly evidences a 
circumscribed view of the exportation doctrine, one that is consistent 
with an increased regulatory focus on risk retention by originating 
entities.99 The court’s discussion of on-point cases reveals a conception 
of the exportation doctrine in which the doctrine is only properly 
extended when the loan remains relatively close to the originating 
bank. Specifically, presented with sister circuit precedent that 
appeared to weigh in favor of the opposite ruling, the court 
distinguished each case by reference to the role the banks continued to 
play in those cases, whether they retained some portion of ownership 
of the debt or continued to collect its interest.100 The court concluded 
that because Midland and the originating banks were entirely separate 
entities and because the originating bank had no ongoing interest in 
the loan, Midland was not entitled to the exportation doctrine.101 
Moreover, the Second Circuit in Madden focused on the proper 
limits of preemption of state usury law claims to the exclusion of the 
contract principle known as “valid-when-made,” which dictates that a 
 
 96. Id. at 251–52. 
 97. Madden, 786 F.3d at 251–52. 
 98. Id. 
 99. For a discussion of risk retention as a regulatory approach to realign incentives in the 
origination and securitization processes, see infra Part III.C. 
 100. See Madden, 786 F.3d at 252 (distinguishing Krispin v. May Dept. Stores Co., 218 F.3d 
919 (8th Cir. 2000), on grounds that in that case “the national bank retained ownership of the 
accounts”); id. at 253 (distinguishing Phipps v. FDIC, 417 F.3d 1006 (8th Cir. 2005), on grounds 
that in that case “the national bank was the entity that charged the interest to which the plaintiffs 
objected”). 
 101. Id. at 252–53. 
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loan that is not usurious when it is made cannot become usurious upon 
assignment.102 The Restatement of Contracts, the Uniform 
Commercial Code, and centuries of case law support the principle of 
valid-when-made, reinforcing the intuitive notion that loan obligations 
are, in essence, currency whose validity cannot be disrupted by the 
mere substitution of obligees.103 The court’s seemingly deliberate 
decision to focus on preemption to the exclusion of the contract 
analysis further strengthens the inference that its principal motivation 
was the imposition of a constraint on the exportation doctrine.  
Finally, the Madden court’s adoption of key arguments from the 
plaintiff-appellant’s brief hints at the court’s motivation to shrink the 
exportation doctrine.104 That brief advocated for a limited conception 
of federal preemption on several grounds, citing the various 
requirements that Dodd-Frank placed on preempting state consumer-
protection laws and pointing to administrative trends toward 
narrowing the scope of preemption.105 In addition to setting forth the 
roadmap that the court would eventually use to distinguish precedent 
from other circuits,106 the plaintiff-appellant’s brief explicated how the 
Second Circuit should—and in fact, exactly how it did—apply the 
current, more stringent standard from Dodd-Frank to find that the 
state usury laws were not preempted.107 That the court’s opinion closely 
tracked a brief dedicated primarily to contracting the scope of state 
consumer-protection-law preemption seems to suggest that the 
decision was motivated by a similar purpose. 
 
 102. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 15, at 8 (“Under the long-
established ‘valid-when-made’ rule, if the interest-rate term in a bank’s original loan agreement 
was nonusurious, the loan does not become usurious upon assignment, and so the assignee may 
lawfully charge interest at the original rate.”). 
 103. See Nichols v. Fearson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 103, 109 (1833) (delineating the “cardinal rule[] 
in the doctrine of usury” that “a contract, which, in its inception, is unaffected by usury, can never 
be invalidated by any subsequent usurious transaction”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 336(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“The right of an assignee is subject to any defense 
or claim of the obligor which accrues before the obligor receives notification of the assignment, 
but not to defenses or claims which accrue thereafter . . . .”); U.C.C. § 2-210(2) (AM. LAW INST. 
& UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) (“Unless otherwise agreed all rights of either seller or buyer can be 
assigned . . . .”). 
 104. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 12, 14–15, 21–25, 33, 39, Madden, 786 F.3d 246 (No. 
14–2131–cv) (setting forth each of the arguments the Second Circuit would ultimately adopt in its 
opinion). 
 105. Id. at 39–42. 
 106. Id. at 25. For a discussion of the court’s distinguishing precedent, see supra note 100 and 
accompanying text. 
 107. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 104, at 39. 
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III.  THE “TRUE LENDER” DOCTRINE 
A recent string of cases, seemingly motivated in part by the same 
concerns as the Madden court—nondeserving institutions exploiting 
the exportation doctrine—have developed and implemented a regime 
that effectively excises those nondeserving lenders from the scope of 
the exportation doctrine while avoiding the overly broad effects of 
Madden. Instead of the imposition of a bright-line rule like that in 
Madden, where the loan holder’s status as a nonbank at the time of 
adjudication was dispositive, the true lender doctrine eschews form in 
favor of substance, examining the economic realities of lending 
arrangements to determine whether the real originator of the loan is 
entitled to the broad protection of the exportation doctrine. 
A. History of the True Lender Doctrine 
The true lender doctrine traces its origins to an effort by Georgia’s 
legislature to eliminate in-state payday lenders that were 
circumventing the state’s usury laws by entering into rent-a-charter 
arrangements with out-of-state banks.108 The Georgia law codified a 
totality-of-the-circumstances test to determine when a “purported 
agent shall be considered a de facto lender” for purposes of applying 
state usury laws.109 The touchstone of the statute’s test is that an agent 
will be considered the de facto lender when “the entire circumstances 
of the transaction show that the purported agent holds, acquires, or 
maintains a predominant economic interest in the revenues generated 
by the loan.”110 
Seemingly influenced, at least in part, by the Georgia statute, the 
first judicial deployment of the test to reach resolution on the merits111 
 
 108. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-17-2(b)(4) (2011). See generally John D. Skees, Note, The 
Resurrection of Historic Usury Principles for Consumption Loans in a Federal Banking System, 
55 CATH. U. L. REV. 1131 (2006) (discussing the Georgia statute and its subsequent legal 
challenges, and advocating for the enactment of similar laws in other states). 
 109. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-17-2(b)(4).  
 110. Id. 
 111. An incipient version of the doctrine was applied in a series of payday-lending cases in 
the early 2000s. While these cases appear to have partially inspired the recent true lender cases, 
the discussions in these early cases are confined to the propriety of removal to federal court of 
state actions after preemption is asserted as a basis for subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., 
Colorado ex rel. Salazar v. Ace Cash Express Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1285 (D. Colo. 2002) 
(remanding to state court because the NBA cannot form the basis of “federal question removal 
jurisdiction in actions against entities which are not banks”). Accordingly, these courts never 
ruled on whether state usury claims are preempted in the face of a true lender theory. See 
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appears to have been in People ex rel. Spitzer v. County Bank of 
Rehoboth Beach.112 In Rehoboth Beach, New York’s attorney general 
brought an action against two nonbank payday lenders and their 
Delaware-chartered bank partner, alleging that all three were part of 
“a scheme to permit [the payday lenders] to circumvent New York’s 
usury laws.”113 The defendants urged the New York appeals court to 
adopt a test to find that the chartered bank, not the nonbank entities, 
was the lender for purposes of determining choice of usury law.114 This 
test was developed by the OCC to help national banks determine where 
a loan is made for purposes of deciding which state’s interest rate limits 
are to be exported.115 The exceedingly formalistic test provides that a 
loan is made where each of three primary lending functions occur—
“the decision to extend credit, the extension of credit itself, and the 
disbursal of the proceeds of a loan.”116 The adoption of this test would 
have conclusively identified the chartered bank as the lender. The 
court, however, rejected this test, explaining: 
It strikes us that we must look to the reality of the arrangement and 
not the written characterization that the parties seek to give it, much 
like Frank Lloyd Wright’s aphorism that “form follows function.” 
Thus, an examination of the totality of the circumstances surrounding 
this type of business association must be used to determine who is the 
“true lender,” with the key factor being “who had the predominant 
economic interest” in the transactions.117 
Several years later, the West Virginia Supreme Court, citing 
Rehoboth Beach, embraced the true lender test.118 The West Virginia 
 
CashCall, Inc. v. Morrisey, No. 12-1274, 2014 WL 2404300, at *14 (W. Va. May 30, 2014) 
(explaining that the removal cases “were not adjudicated on the merits”). 
 112. People ex rel. Spitzer v. Cty. Bank of Rehoboth Beach, 846 N.Y.S.2d 436 (App. Div. 
2007).  
 113. Id. at 438.  
 114. Id. 
 115. See OCC, Interpretive Letter No. 822, at 2–3 (Feb. 17, 1998) (elucidating the test for 
where a bank is “located” for purposes of the exportation doctrine). 
 116. Id. at 8 (emphasis removed) (quoting 140 CONG. REC. S12,789 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1994) 
(statement of Sen. Roth)). 
 117. Bank of Rehoboth Beach, 846 N.Y.S.2d at 438–39. The court remanded the case to the 
district court, id. at 439, after which the parties settled for $5.2 million. Press Release, N.Y. State 
Office of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General Cuomo Announces Distribution of $5.2 Million 
Settlement in “Rent-a-Bank” Payday Lending Scheme (Nov. 17, 2009), 
http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/attorney-general-cuomo-announces-distribution-52-million-
settlement-rent-bank-payday [https://perma.cc/6AZE-E2XG]. 
 118. See CashCall, Inc. v. Morrisey, No. 12-1274, 2014 WL 2404300, at *15 (W. Va. May 30, 
2014).  
HANNON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/1/2018  12:16 AM 
1282  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:1261 
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s application of the test to 
conclude that the nonbank payday lender CashCall, not its state-
chartered bank partner that formally originated its loans, was the true 
or de facto lender of the loans at issue.119 The nonbank defendants, like 
the nonbanks in Rehoboth Beach, had urged the court to conclude that 
the real lender should be determined by simple reference to which 
entity both set the terms and conditions of the loan and extended the 
credit.120 The court characterized this test as an examination of “only 
the superficial appearance of CashCall’s business model.”121 
Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court’s conclusion, sufficiently 
supported by its “extraordinarily thorough” opinion,122 that the 
arrangement between CashCall and its bank partner “placed the entire 
monetary burden and risk of the loan program on CashCall, and not 
on [the bank].”123 
Because CashCall was not entitled to federal preemption of state 
usury law claims, the West Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the trial 
court’s determination that the loans were usurious.124 The court further 
affirmed a $10 million judgment—a figure arrived at by quadrupling 
the amount of interest charged to CashCall’s 292 debtors in West 
Virginia—as well as the trial court’s determination that all of 
CashCall’s loans to West Virginians were void and “any debts still 
owing . . . cancelled.”125 
 
 119. Id. at *14–15. 
 120. Id. at *14. 
 121. Id. at *15. 
 122. Id. at *24. The trial court found that: 
CashCall had to procure the personal guarantee of its sole owner and stockholder . . . 
to personally guarantee all of CashCall’s financial obligations to the [bank], including 
the amounts of the loans prior to “purchase” by CashCall. Also, CashCall had to 
indemnify [the bank] against all losses arising out of the Agreement, including claims 
asserted by borrowers. CashCall was under a contractual obligation to purchase the 
loans originated and funded by [the bank] only if CashCall’s underwriting guidelines 
were followed when approving the loan.  
Id. at *7. 
 123. Id. at *6. 
 124. Id. at *7. 
 125. Id. at *8. Jurisdictions are divided on whether a usurious loan should be judicially 
reformed, making only the impermissible interest uncollectable, or whether a finding of usury 
renders the entire loan void. Compare id., with McCormick v. Indep. Life & Annuity Co., 794 
F.3d 817, 818 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Cancellation of the principal balance as a remedy for excessive 
interest is legally impossible in Wisconsin . . . .”). 
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Apparently buoyed by the success against CashCall in West 
Virginia and another case in Maryland,126 the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB) successfully persuaded a federal district 
court in California to apply the true lender test to CashCall’s 
partnership with a tribal financial institution on the Cheyenne 
reservation in CFPB v. CashCall, Inc.127 In this partnership, as 
described by the court: 
CashCall, and not [the originating bank], placed its money at risk. It 
is undisputed that CashCall deposited enough money into a reserve 
account to fund two days of loans . . . and that [the originating bank] 
used this money to fund consumer loans. It is also undisputed [that] 
CashCall purchased all of [the originating bank’s] loans, and in fact 
paid [the bank] more for each loan than the amount actually financed 
. . . . Although CashCall waited a minimum of three days after the 
funding of each loan before purchasing it, it is undisputed that 
CashCall purchased each and every loan before any payments on the 
loan had been made. CashCall assumed all economic risks and 
benefits of the loans immediately upon assignment. CashCall bore the 
risk of default as well as the regulatory risk. Indeed, CashCall agreed 
to “fully indemnify [originating bank] for all costs arising or resulting 
from any and all civil, criminal, or administrative claims or actions, 
including but not limited to fines, costs, assessments and/or penalties 
. . . [and] all reasonable attorneys fees and legal costs associated with 
a defense of such claim or action.”128 
The court marshalled each of the true lender authorities129 and 
cogently applied a synthesized rule to the above arrangement before 
concluding, “[b]ased on the totality of the circumstances,” that 
CashCall “had the predominant economic interest in the loans and was 
the ‘true lender’ and real party in interest.”130 
The defendants in CashCall moved for, and the trial court granted, 
an order certifying interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit for that 
 
 126. See CashCall, Inc. v. Md. Comm’r of Fin. Regulation, 139 A.3d 990, 1005 (Md. 2016) 
(relying in part on determination that CashCall is the de facto lender in its lending arrangements 
with banks to conclude that CashCall is not exempt from state regulation of “credit services 
business[es]”).  
 127. CFPB v. CashCall, Inc., No. CV 15-7522-JFW (RAOx), 2016 WL 4820635, at *5–6 (C.D. 
Cal. Aug. 31, 2016), appeal denied, No. 17-80006 (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 2017). 
 128. Id. at *6 (final alteration in original). 
 129. See id. at *5–6 (citing the removal cases, the Georgia statute, Rehoboth Beach, and 
Morrisey to outline the contours of the true lender doctrine). 
 130. Id. at *6. 
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court to weigh in on the propriety of the true lender test.131 But the 
Ninth Circuit, without elaboration, denied the interlocutory appeal.132 
Accordingly, the true lender opinion stands, and the case has 
progressed to the damages phase.133 
B. Madden Under a True Lender Analysis 
Reliance on the true lender doctrine to determine whether a third 
party is entitled to preemption of state consumer-protection laws 
would effectively avoid any of the market turbulence sown by Madden. 
The true lender doctrine seeks, essentially, to expose sham transactions 
in which a nonbank entity temporarily occupies the form of a bank to 
evade state law. Any assignment of loans that does not give rise to 
suspicions that this arrangement is at play will not implicate the true 
lender doctrine at all. 
In Madden, Bank of America had originated the loans at issue—
credit cards—with an uncontroverted desire to play the role of lender 
in perpetuity and retain any and all risk relating to the loans, including 
default. There was no agreement or scheme between Bank of America 
and Midland Funding by which Bank of America would confer 
preemptive force on the loans and subsequently sell them to Midland. 
Bank of America, by any formulation of the true lender test, was 
unequivocally the real party in interest. That certain accounts 
defaulted, leading to a loss on Bank of America’s balance sheet and a 
sale of the loan obligations to a third-party collector, cannot change the 
fact that, at the point of origination, Bank of America was 
functionally—not just formally—the true lender. Indeed, in this 
context, the bank was forced to absorb the full impact of the economic 
risk it assumed after the borrowers at issue defaulted on their 
obligations.  
 
 131. Barbara S. Mishkin, Federal District Court Certifies Interlocutory Appeal in CFPB 
Lawsuit Against CashCall, BALLARD SPAHR LLP (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.
consumerfinancemonitor.com/2017/01/19/federal-district-court-certifies-interlocutory-appeal-in-
cfpb-lawsuit-against-cashcall [https://perma.cc/DNF3-JWFE]. 
 132. See Order Denying Interlocutory Appeal, CFPB v. CashCall, Inc., No. 17-80006 (9th Cir. 
Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2017/04/
order.pdf [https://perma.cc/M7HQ-XC8L]. 
 133. See Order Denying Defendants’ Motion for a Stay of Proceedings at 2, CFPB v. 
CashCall, Inc., No. CV 15-7522-JFW (RAOx) (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2017), ECF No. 253 (directing 
the parties to file a joint report setting forth a trial schedule for the remaining issues in the case).  
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Moreover, the true lender test does not at all affect the bedrock 
contractual precept of valid-when-made.134 The cases identifying 
nonbanks as the true lender do not hold, as the Second Circuit did in 
Madden, that the loans at issue have become usurious upon assignment 
to a nonbank entity. Rather, those cases found that the loans at issue 
were not actually originated by the bank at all, and that the true 
originator was in reality the nonbank entity. Accordingly, under the 
true lender doctrine, the subsequent assignee of loans originated by a 
bona fide lender—that is, a lender that is not originating loans on 
behalf of a third party as part of a scheme to evade state consumer 
laws—is equally entitled to those privileges in effect at the time of 
origination. 
C. Benefits of the True Lender Doctrine 
As mentioned earlier, rent-a-charter participants are likely to 
seize on factors identified by courts applying the true lender doctrine 
and subsequently attempt to structure the form of their relationships 
so as to avoid the appearance of sham transactions. Indeed, Chapman 
& Cutler LLP generated client-facing content outlining the emergence 
of the true lender doctrine and suggesting that in light of the doctrine’s 
judicial success, rent-a-charter parties should consider implementing 
structures in which “the bank has substantive duties and/or an 
economic interest in the program or loans.”135 
This suggestion, while sparse on details, illustrates that efforts to 
structure lending partnerships to evade a finding that the nonbank 
entity is the true lender will necessarily require the chartered bank to 
play a greater role in the lending.136 More specifically, because courts 
applying the true lender tests will disregard the names parties give to 
their relationships and will instead seek to determine where the risks 
genuinely lie, any successful strategy to evade an adverse true lender 
finding must actually shift some of the lending risk and substantive 
duties of the lending process to the bank. Accordingly, the virtue of the 
true lender doctrine is that the more the parties try to avoid the 
 
 134. For the contracts law underpinnings of valid-when-made, see supra Part II. 
 135. Chapman Client Alert: New Federal Court Decision Applies the “True Lender” Doctrine 
to Internet-Based Payday Lender, CHAPMAN & CUTLER LLP 2 (Feb. 1, 2016), 
https://www.chapman.com/media/publication/601_Chapman_Federal_Court_Decision_Applies_
True_Lender_Doctrine_to_Internet-Based_Lenders_020116.pdf [https://perma.cc/4X5W-75ZX].  
 136. See id. (stating that the authors were “aware that some internet-based lending programs 
are considering structural changes” to shift more substantive duties and economic interest to the 
bank originator). 
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appearance of sham transactions, the less the parties actually engage in 
sham transactions. At some point on the continuum of possible 
allocations of risk, both credit and legal, between bank and nonbank 
entity, the bank that is entitled to the protection of the exportation 
doctrine becomes the lender that enjoys it—perhaps jointly with the 
nonbank entity.  
This development may have two salutary effects, elaborated 
below, on rent-a-charter activity. First, instead of serving as a mere 
conduit, the bank, because its balance sheet is now actually exposed to 
the nonbank’s credit decisions, must undertake affirmative efforts to 
monitor the quality of loans it originates. Second, the more these loans 
remain on the books of banks, the more they are subject to the bank’s 
regulators,137 if only by proxy, and the more likely they are to be in 
compliance with fundamental principles of bank risk management and 
consumer protection. 
1. Dodd-Frank’s Reliance on Risk Retention and How the True 
Lender Doctrine Encourages the Same Realignment of Incentives.  
Federal regulators, as mandated by Dodd-Frank,138 are increasingly 
employing the concept of risk retention as a regulatory tool to remedy 
misaligned incentives between originating entities and subsequent 
owners of debt.139 In response to the perception that the absence of 
credit risk exposure for originators140 caused pervasive deterioration of 
 
 137. Very generally, nationally-chartered banks have as their primary regulator the OCC, and 
state-chartered banks are monitored at the federal level by either the Federal Reserve or the 
FDIC (depending on whether the bank elects to join the Federal Reserve System), and are 
additionally under the supervisory jurisdiction of relevant state banking authorities. For a more 
complete description of which banks are monitored by which regulators, see MARK JICKLING & 
EDWARD V. MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., WHO REGULATES WHOM? AN OVERVIEW OF 
U.S. FINANCIAL SUPERVISION (2010), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40249.pdf [https://perma.cc/
K8XJ-UTGP]. 
 138. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(b)(1)–(2) (2018) (directing relevant federal banking regulators to 
propose and promulgate rules that require bank sponsors of asset-backed securities to retain no 
less than 5 percent of the credit risk of nonexempt securities).  
 139. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 86, at 14, 43 
(summarizing the incentive alignment problems in securitization processes, and explaining that 
retention of credit risk “gives securitizers or originators an explicit pecuniary stake in the 
performance of their assets”). 
 140. See id. at 43–44 (detailing the incentive alignment problems revealed during the financial 
crisis which were created, in part, because “[o]riginators typically did not retain any interest in 
individual mortgages sold for securitization”). 
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underwriting standards141 before the financial crisis, Congress sought 
to require lenders to retain sufficient risk to prevent the unsound 
extension of credit.142 The gist of these efforts is to incent banks to 
originate only those loans they would feel comfortable retaining on 
their balance sheet. 
Here, the true lender doctrine accomplishes this same goal, 
effectively transferring some proportion of risk to the originating bank 
that, in most cases, would previously have been exposed to zero risk by 
virtue of the terms of the rent-a-charter agreement.143 
2. Regulation by Proxy.  The Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) and the OCC are each tasked, inter alia, with 
ensuring the safety and soundness144 of the banks they supervise as well 
as promoting general tenets of fair dealing with customers.145 
Accordingly, any threat posed to a bank’s prudential outlook by virtue 
of the litigation, compliance, reputational, operational, and credit risks 
attendant to third-party lending arrangements is squarely within their 
supervisory purview. In this way, the ability of a bank’s primary 
regulator to ensure both prudential and consumer-protection 
 
 141. Underwriting in the lending context refers to the process that banks undertake to 
ascertain the relative risk of the extension of credit. Factors include individual creditworthiness, 
loan-to-value ratio, and other indicia of default risk. 
 142. See generally BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 86 (outlining 
congressional intent in mandating the production of a risk retention study and subsequent 
rulemaking).  
 143. See, e.g., CashCall, Inc. v. Morrisey, No. 12-1274, 2014 WL 2404300, at *14 n.19 (W. Va. 
May 30, 2014) (detailing the agreement between bank and nonbank lender which insulated the 
bank from all credit and legal risk, and provided for considerable payments to continue 
originating the nonbank’s loans).  
 144. “Safety and soundness” is bank-regulatory shorthand for a regulator’s mandate to 
prevent the collapse of a bank and its collateral damage to depositors, the taxpayer, and the 
greater economy. See Making Sense of the Federal Reserve: Safety and Soundness, FED. RES. 
BANK OF SAINT LOUIS, https://www.stlouisfed.org/in-plain-english/safety-and-soundness 
[https://perma.cc/2QFG-9MSB] (“The nation’s banking system is only as safe and sound as the 
banks within the system. So the Federal Reserve examines banks regularly to identify and contain 
bank risks.”). 
 145. See Mission, Vision, and Values, FDIC, https://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/
strategic/mission.html [https://perma.cc/7EKM-9EAU] (“The Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) is an independent agency created by the Congress to maintain stability and 
public confidence in the nation’s financial system by . . . examining and supervising financial 
institutions for safety and soundness and consumer protection . . . .”); About the OCC, OCC, 
https://www.occ.treas.gov/about/what-we-do/mission/index-about.html [https://perma.cc/BMP3-
TN7W] (“To ensure that national banks and federal savings associations operate in a safe and 
sound manner, provide fair access to financial services, treat customers fairly, and comply with 
applicable laws and regulations.”). 
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compliance in its supervised banks, through formal and informal 
enforcement mechanisms,146 is very likely to have a beneficial 
moderating effect on third-party lending accomplished through rent-a-
charter arrangements structured to avoid a finding that the nonbank is 
the true lender. Quite intuitively, the longer and more substantive the 
role of the bank in the rent-a-charter arrangement, the more likely it is 
that the bank’s regulators will effectively detect and deter abusive or 
unsafe practices and encourage or mandate conformance with 
fundamental principles of safety and soundness and consumer 
protection. 
The FDIC has long recognized the array of dangers that 
accompany the intersection of nonbank lending and traditional 
banking, and has periodically provided guidance to its member 
institutions on properly managing these risks. At various points since 
2005, the FDIC has updated its advice to meet new trends in payday-
lending relationships with federally insured banks;147 in 2016, the FDIC 
proposed guidance on how banks looking to partner with third-party 
lenders might do so more responsibly, by mitigating credit, compliance, 
and operational risk.148 The FDIC’s proposed guidance would require 
that banks “engaging in significant third-party lending activities . . . 
maintain capital149 well-above regulatory minimums,”150 and would 
increase the frequency of such bank’s examinations.151 
Although the OCC has consistently advocated for an expansive 
conception of preemption of state consumer-protection laws for 
national banks,152 it has also recognized the risks inherent in permitting 
nonbanks to access the privileges accorded to traditional banks, and 
has periodically issued guidance to nationally chartered banks that 
 
 146. See BARR ET AL., supra note 24, at 841–45 (summarizing the various formal and informal 
enforcement mechanisms by which federal and state regulators seek to ensure the safety and 
soundness of banks).  
 147. FDIC, FIL–14–2005, GUIDELINES FOR PAYDAY LENDING (2015), https://www.fdic.gov/
news/news/financial/2005/fil1405a.html [https://perma.cc/U34A-CVZU].  
 148. FDIC, FIL–50–2016, EXAMINATION GUIDANCE FOR THIRD-PARTY LENDING (2016), 
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2016/fil16050a.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9AJ-FEPW].  
 149. In the bank-regulatory context, capital functions both as a metric of a bank’s stability and 
as a tool for regulators to ensure that a bank’s loss-absorbing cushion is commensurate with its 
risk profile so as to prevent the need for taxpayer bailouts. See BARR ET AL., supra note 24, at 259 
(“In functional and slightly idealized terms, capital measures the amount of losses that an 
institution can suffer without impairing its obligations to creditors and other claimants.”). 
 150. FDIC, supra note 148, at 11. 
 151. Id. at 13. 
 152. For a discussion of the OCC’s promulgation of broad preemption determinations for 
national banks, see supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text.  
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elect to enter into third-party lending relationships.153 Like the FDIC’s 
recommendations, the OCC’s bulletins and advisory letters urge 
national banks originating loans on behalf of third parties to play an 
active role in monitoring the quality of the loans and the behavior of 
the third-party lender.154 The OCC additionally promulgated rules 
providing that, when the OCC determines that it must conduct an 
investigation into a bank’s third-party relationship, that bank must pay 
the assessment of special examination fees.155 The OCC went so far as 
to put rent-a-charter parties on notice in 2000 by warning that they 
“should not assume that the benefits of a bank charter, particularly with 
respect to the application of state and local law, would be available to 
them.”156  
A bank’s primary regulatory supervisor exerts considerable 
influence over its operations in ways that few regulatory entities can 
claim vis-à-vis most third-party lenders by providing general guidance 
about best practices alongside the omnipresent threat of informal and 
formal enforcement processes. By virtue of this influence, loans 
originated through third-party relationships in which the bank assumes 
a substantive role in the lending with a continued economic interest in 
the loans are likely to be more compliant with fundamental principles 
of bank risk management and consumer protection. 
D. Benefits over a Statutory Approach 
It may be said that courts are inappropriate actors to eradicate 
these sham transactions. But unlike a legislative approach, the inherent 
agility of the true lender doctrine as applied by courts will ensure that 
the effort retains teeth. Even if meaningful legislation is enacted, free 
from loopholes that undermine its efficacy, a statutory approach 
 
 153. See OCC, OCC BULL. NO. 2013-29, THIRD-PARTY RELATIONSHIP (2013), 
https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2013/bulletin-2013-29.html [https://perma.cc/
VE29-JEGA] (warning of the risks to banks posed by third-party relationships in the absence of 
adequate ex ante due diligence in conjunction with ongoing monitoring of the third party’s 
behavior); OCC, ADVISORY LETTER 2000–10 ON PAYDAY LENDING (2000) (“Such third-party 
arrangements significantly increase risks to the bank and the OCC’s supervisory concerns.”) 
[hereinafter OCC, ADVISORY LETTER]. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See 12 C.F.R. § 8.6 (2018) (providing for the assessment of additional supervisory fees 
against the bank to cover the cost of investigations “if the OCC determines that assessment of the 
fee is warranted . . . because of the high risk or unusual nature of the activities performed” by the 
third party). 
 156. OCC, ADVISORY LETTER, supra note 153.  
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cannot adequately anticipate innovations in rent-a-charter 
arrangements.  
The saga of the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act 
(HOEPA) is instructive here.157 The legislation targeted subprime-
mortgage lending in light of reports of increasingly abusive home 
lending practices.158 It increased disclosure requirements at the point 
of origination, imposed statutory damages against lenders for 
violations, and created liability for entities that subsequently purchase 
subprime mortgages that do not conform to HOEPA’s standards.159 
But the static nature of the statute meant that “lenders could easily 
evade HOEPA’s restrictions by structuring loans to fall just below 
HOEPA’s bright line, high thresholds.”160 
Here, however, the dynamic quality of the true lender doctrine—
and the courts’ ability to animate it—is uniquely positioned to avoid 
the kinds of shortcomings displayed by legislative efforts like HOEPA. 
A judicial doctrine that is capable of identifying the real incentives of 
the parties without regard to the obfuscating names or forms they 
employ is likely to be considerably more effective than targeting 
legislation which sets forth discrete floors or ceilings which can be 
easily evaded by nonbank lenders.161 That the doctrine relies heavily 
on a fact-intensive, totality-of-the-circumstances analysis militates 
strongly in favor of a judicial approach, inherently more capable of 
adjudicating arrangements on a case-by-case basis. Indeed, the 
nontheoretical contours of this test have yet to be delineated precisely, 
owing principally to the small number of cases resolved on the merits. 
Courts are the most competent institution to mold the shape of the 
doctrine when parties invariably begin to alter their arrangements to 
avoid legal risk. To be sure, the arrangement at issue in CashCall 
 
 157. Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act, Subtitle B of Title I of the Riegle 
Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 
Stat. 2190 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 158. BARR ET AL., supra note 24, at 593. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. Additionally, by the time HOEPA was enacted, the mortgage industry had 
successfully lobbied for the inclusion of a series of carve-outs, the largest of which removed 
purchase mortgages—that is, “first mortgages”—from its ambit entirely. Id. As even a casual 
observer of the financial crisis of 2008 would surmise, the statute did not effectively curtail abuse 
in the subprime mortgage market. See id. (explaining that between 2004 and 2011, the act applied 
to less than one half of one percent of all nonpurchase mortgages). 
 161. Congress could, of course, codify the basic principles of the true lender doctrine. But the 
fact-bound application of such a statute is certain to rest, at some level of review, with the courts—
where the doctrine already exists. 
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presented perhaps the most clear-cut form of a sham transaction: the 
parties employed a relationship blatantly designed to bypass interest-
rate limits. If this type of transaction represented the final attempt by 
rent-a-charter participants to create a sham transaction, Congress 
could draft a statute to effectively dispose of the phenomenon by 
proscribing the structure presented in that case. But rent-a-charter 
parties will invariably tweak their structure162 in pursuit of the same 
end—an end run around state consumer-protection laws—with only 
minimal reallocation of lending risk. Accordingly, the incremental 
method of the common law, guided by continual judicial appraisals of 
the impact on parties of the most recent judicial application of the 
doctrine, is well positioned to define the metes and bounds of the 
doctrine.  
It is true, of course, that such an approach will involve an element 
of uncertainty on the part of rent-a-charter participants. But this 
uncertainty is clearly different in scope and kind from that generated 
by the Madden decision. The true lender test specifically targets actors 
entering into bank partnerships with the intent to evade state interest 
rate limitations and other consumer-protection laws, a group that can 
be fairly charged with an awareness that their activities are afield of 
any kind of safe harbor. Moreover, the uncertainty faced by rent-a-
charter parties is no different from any common law doctrine whose 
deployment is necessarily a fact-intensive endeavor. Like a finding of 
unclean hands or lack of good faith, courts can only identify the true 
lender on the basis of all the facts before them, and parties seeking to 
structure their behavior accordingly must do so by analogy to 
adjudicated cases.163 
Additionally, banking regulation should be fundamentally 
conceptualized as a tradeoff. As Professor Howell Jackson explains: 
The premise . . . is that an entity should not be allowed to engage in 
the business of banking unless the entity complies with the regulatory 
 
 162. For a discussion of measures that rent-a-charter parties are presently considering to 
avoid a finding that the third party is the true lender, see infra Part III.C.2. 
 163. Some practitioners in the FinTech area have noted that the true lender jurisprudence 
provides ample guidance for more legitimate nonbank lenders. See, e.g., Chris Bruce, Appeals 
Court May Tackle ‘True Lender’ Debate Affecting Fintechs, Online Lenders, BLOOMBERG L.: 
BANKING (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.bna.com/appeals-court-may-n57982085931 [https://
perma.cc/48LK-MBQW] (quoting a partner at Goodwin Procter who believes that the test from 
CashCall “can be helpful because it provides a little bit of a roadmap,” adding that “[t]he 
predominant economic interest test is a higher-bar test for bank partnerships, but one that bank 
partnerships can satisfy”). 
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safeguards designed to restrain the risks associated with depository 
institutions and also presumably complies with the social obligations 
and political constraints imposed on the banking industry.164 
This conception of banking helps to explain the asymmetrical 
relationship between banks and their regulators, for which there is no 
analogue in the relationships between other industries and their 
regulators. Indeed, it is this same justification on which financial 
regulators base their imposition of a variety of regulatory mechanisms 
whose precise form is purposely unclear ex ante. For instance, the 
precise inputs and formula for the Federal Reserve’s annual stress-
testing processes165 remain generally opaque.166 This lack of 
transparency, while bitterly opposed by banks, is defended on grounds 
that it is necessary to prevent banks from gaming the models so as to 
appear more financially healthy than they actually are.167  
As with any other condition on the business of banking, the 
uncertainty faced by banks who elect to enter into third-party lending 
relationships as a result of an under-defined true lender doctrine is 
simply an extension of this logic: an unavoidable restraint on the risks 
associated with those institutions who have been permitted to engage 
in the business of banking. 
Finally, even if the true lender doctrine was amenable to 
distillation by statute or rulemaking, any push to achieve this end will 
invariably run headlong into a federal government that is openly 
hostile to financial regulation. Clearly, the current administration, 
Congress, and the CFPB are each motivated and well-positioned either 
to eliminate consumer-financial regulations or to reduce the 
 
 164. Howell E. Jackson, Regulation in a Multisectored Financial Services Industry: An 
Exploratory Essay, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 319, 368 (1999). A more contemporary example of this view 
is found throughout the OCC’s white paper exploring the grant of a limited charter for 
marketplace lenders. See OCC, supra note 14, at 1 (“[I]f [the OCC] decide[s] to grant a national 
charter to a particular fintech company, that institution will be held to the same high standards of 
safety and soundness, fair access, and fair treatment of customers that all federally chartered 
institutions must meet.”). 
 165. Stress testing refers to two processes—Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review, and 
the Dodd-Frank Act Stress Tests, both of which are accomplished by the Federal Reserve—in 
which the financial health of the largest bank holding companies is evaluated based on how their 
balance sheets would fare when subjected to varying degrees of adverse economic conditions. See 
BARR ET AL., supra note 24, at 308–12 (explaining the impetus, rationale, and operation of stress 
testing). 
 166. See id. at 313 (noting criticism of the confidentiality of stress-testing models and 
assumptions). 
 167. See id. (explaining that the Federal Reserves’ rationale for declining to disclose detailed 
assumptions and model inputs is to prevent banks from gaming the models). 
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enforcement of extant consumer-financial laws. President Donald 
Trump has advocated for the repeal of Dodd-Frank both as a 
candidate168 and as president,169 and his administration reportedly 
considered “making a high-profile run on the [CFPB],” but decided 
against that path after polling data revealed an agency “too popular to 
pick a public fight with.”170  
In November of 2017, however, President Trump was finally able 
to begin remaking the CFPB by appointing Mick Mulvaney—whose 
avowed beliefs are inimical to the CFPB171—to be the acting director 
of the agency that had secured the most full-throated judicial 
endorsement of the true lender doctrine to date.172 Since leading the 
CFPB, Mulvaney has halted rulemaking, imposed a freeze on new 
enforcement actions, and actively lobbied legislators to pursue 
congressional invalidation of a CFPB rule governing short-term 
lending that was promulgated before Mulvaney arrived.173 
Meanwhile, the only real question in Congress is which version of 
financial deregulatory reform will garner enough support to become 
 
 168. See Emily Flitter & Steve Holland, Trump Preparing Plan to Dismantle Obama’s Wall 
Street Reform Law, REUTERS (May 17, 2016, 8:14 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
election-trump-banks/trump-preparing-plan-to-dismantle-obamas-wall-street-reform-law-
idUSKCN0Y900J [https://perma.cc/9YXC-EMLU] (reporting on then-candidate Trump’s plan to 
repeal Dodd-Frank). 
 169. See Benjamin Bain & Jesse Hamilton, Trump Pledges ‘Big Number’ on Dodd-Frank in 
Anti-Rule Push, BLOOMBERG POLITICS (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2017-01-30/trump-pledges-big-number-on-dodd-frank-in-anti-regulatory-push [https://
perma.cc/62J2-XFX3] (quoting President Trump’s promise “to do a big number on Dodd-
Frank”). 
 170. Steve Eder, Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Stacy Cowley, Republicans Want To Sideline 
This Regulator. But It May Be Too Popular., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/31/business/consumer-financial-protection-bureau.html 
[https://perma.cc/W75S-E4GS]. 
 171. See Renae Merle, The CFPB Now Has Two Acting Directors. And Nobody Knows Which 
One Should Lead the Federal Agency, WASH. POST (Nov. 24, 2017), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2017/11/24/the-cfpb-now-has-two-acting-directors-and-
nobody-knows-which-one-should-lead-the-federal-agency/?utm_term=.1dcfccc520f4 
[https://perma.cc/H32C-JDKH] (“Trump proposed his White House budget director, Mick 
Mulvaney, as the acting director of the CFPB, which Mulvaney once called a ‘joke’ and said he 
wished didn’t exist.”). 
 172. For a review of CashCall, Inc., see supra notes 127–35 and accompanying text. 
 173. See Ian McKendry, Mulvaney’s First Days at CFPB: Payday, Personnel and a Prank, AM. 
BANKER (Dec. 4, 2017, 8:00 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/cfpbs-mulvaney-backs-
congressional-repeal-of-payday-lending-rule [https://perma.cc/Z8MH-PG9R] (detailing 
Mulvaney’s actions in the initial weeks of his CFPB tenure). 
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law: the House’s extreme Financial CHOICE Act,174 passed by the 
House in June 2017 along party lines, or a more moderate bipartisan 
bill making its way through the Senate.175 Even if the current CFPB 
leadership resumed the operation of the bureau consistent with its 
mission, this Congress has displayed a clear desire to exercise any 
controls at its disposal to block the proliferation of consumer-financial 
regulation.176 With a president, Congress, and the CFPB intent on 
achieving a decrease in financial regulation and associated 
enforcement, any suggestion that a statutory or administrative 
approach is preferable to the true lender doctrine is not generally 
tenable.  
CONCLUSION 
The modern scope of the exportation doctrine bears little 
relationship to its historical justification. Moreover, the exigencies of 
consumer protection and the mitigation of future financial crises 
militate strongly in favor of the doctrine’s curtailment. Nonbank 
entities, at minimum, should not be allowed the benefit of the doctrine 
by temporarily occupying banks for the sole purpose of originating 
loans that are immune from state financial-consumer-protection laws. 
The experience of the Madden ruling cautions strongly against a blunt, 
overly broad ruling, while the inefficacy of HOEPA weighs against 
legislation that may prove unresponsive or watered down upon its 
enactment. The true lender doctrine’s singular focus on substance over 
form, combined with judicial agility to examine each factual 
constellation and detect any obfuscating formalities implemented by 
rent-a-charter parties, is presently the most effective way to sensibly 
limit the reach of the exportation doctrine. And, to the degree that 
banks assume more substantive duties in the lending process and retain 
some measure of risk in seeking to comply with the doctrine, the results 
 
 174. Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. (as passed by House, June 8, 2017). 
Transparently hostile to consumer financial protection, the CHOICE Act forbids the CFPB from 
even maintaining a database of complaints received from consumers, id. § 724, and completely 
eliminates the agency’s authority to proscribe unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts and practices by 
depository institutions, id. § 735. 
 175. Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, S. 2155, 115th 
Cong. (as reported by S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, Dec. 18, 2017). 
 176. See Joint Resolution Providing for Congressional Disapproval Under Chapter 8 of Title 
5, United States Code, of the Rule Submitted by Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection 
Relating to “Arbitration Agreements,” Pub. L. No. 115-74, 131 Stat. 1243 (2017) (invalidating the 
CFPB’s consumer-financial arbitration rule that had been promulgated pursuant to express 
authorization of Dodd-Frank). 
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are broadly consistent with regulatory approaches that have been 
deployed in the wake of the financial crisis.  
 
